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A SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO
THE RIDDLE OF OBSCENITY
ALBERT B. GERBER t
In his concurring opinion in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,'
Mr. Justice Douglas relates an anecdote concerning a well-known Rus-
sian author who was banished to Siberia because of the "pernicious"
character of a manuscript found by the police during a search of his
home. The author had previously sent the article to a magazine for
publication and while he was in Siberia it cleared censorship and was
published in a widely circulated and well-respected magazine.2 This
happened under the tyranny of the Russian Czars. One would like to
believe that it could not happen in the United States today. Under our
law of obscenity, however, it not only could happen, but variations on
the theme occur with monotonous regularity.
"For the most part, the purpose of the criminal law is only to
induce external conformity to rule," 3 and to accomplish its purpose the
people, or at least the lawyers and judges, must be able to understand
and apply the rule. But the criminal law of obscenity has become such
a jungle of verbiage that no one could clearly set forth its rules of
conduct.
Today authors, publishers, distributors, and vendors of books and
periodicals have no guide for determining what is and what is not
obscene. Under normal conditons a careful businessman employs able
counsel, follows his advice carefully, and can look forward to remaining
free of criminal charges. Such is not the case with respect to obscenity.
In this twilight zone no one knows the answer in a given situation
until the Supreme Court renders a decision.4 A startling example is
t B.S. 1934, LL.B. 1937, LL.M. 1942, University of Pennsylvania; M.A. 1941,
George Washington University. Member, Pennsylvania and United States Supreme
Court Bars.
1372 U.S. 58, 73-74 (1963), 51 CALIn. L. REv. 620; cf. 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1162
(1962) ; 8 UTAH L. REv. 70 (1962).
2 The anecdote is quoted by Justice Douglas from KENNAN, SIBmIA AND THE
Exn= SYSTEm 60 (1958).
5 HoLms, THE COmmON LAw 49 (Little, Brown & Co. ed. 1881).
4 justice Black refers to the situation as the "Court's becoming a Supreme Board
of Censors-reading books and viewing television performances to determine whether,
if permitted, they might adversely affect the morals of the people throughout the
many diversified local communities in this vast country." Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959).
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Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer' which is obscene in New York,6
Connecticut,7 Florida," Philadelphia,9 and elsewhere,"0 but not obscene
in California," Massachusetts,"2 Wisconsin,13 and Chicago.14 Although
a split in authority among the states is not unusual, it is unique for a
Supreme Court decision to do no more than settle whether or not
Tropic of Cancer is obscene under constitutional standards. 5 The next
book to use four-letter words or furnish overly candid descriptions of
sexual acts may well have to go through the same three years of
criminal and civil litigation as Tropic of Cancer. The reality of this
problem will soon be apparent, with Tropic of Capricorn 6 and Fanny
Hill '" waiting in the wings to become the subjects of litigation.'8
What, if any, remedies can cure this distressing state of the law?
Since reams have been written on the law of obscenity,'9 the only ex-
5 (Grove Press ed. 1961).
6 People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).7 State v. Huntington, No. 24657, Super. Ct. Hartford County, Conn., 1962.
8 Grove Press, Inc. v. Florida, 156 So. 2d 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1963).
9 Commonwealth v. Robin, No. 3177, C.P. Philadelphia County, Pa., 1962.
-0 In Los Angeles, prior to clearance by the Supreme Court of California, it
was held obscene in People v. Smith, App. Dep't, Super. Ct 1962, cert. granted, 373
U.S. 901 (1963) ; Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953). In Maryland,
the highest court reversed a conviction on other grounds but held that the book could
be found obscene. Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962).
"1 Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
12Attorney General v. The Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11,
184 N.E.2d 328 (1962).
13 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963).
14 Heiman v. Morris, No. 61 S.19718, Super. Ct. Cook County, Ill., 1962.
15 See Note, 76 HA v. L. REv. 54, 125 (1962) : "As was the case in Roth, however,
the opinions in Manual raise as many questions as they answer."
16 (Grove Press ed. 1961).
17 CLELAND, MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE (G. P. Putnam ed. 1963).
First published in England circa 1749 and long regarded as a classic of eroticism,
this is its first publication by a respectable publisher in the United States. The book
also was the first subject of judicial censorship of literature in the United States.
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821). In some respects we have now made
the full circle.
ISFanny Hill has taken the lead apparently because Capricorn is so similar to
Cancer that prosecutors are awaiting final decision on the latter before going after
the former. The early returns on Fanny Hill demonstrate the difficulties faced by
the courts in reaching any type of agreement In Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's Sons,
40 Misc. 2d 28, 243 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1963), Justice Marks granted a preliminary
injunction restraining the defendants from "publishing, selling . . . distributing" the
book on the ground of legal obscenity. The court found the book "patently offensive
and utterly without any social value." Id. at 148. A month later, 40 Misc. 2d 28,
242 [sic] N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. 1963), Justice Klein vacated the injunction and
entered judgment for the defendant, on the ground that "the book can in no manner
whatsoever be characterized as 'patently offensive' when examined in the light of
current community standards." Id. at 752.
19Without endeavoring to furnish a complete bibliography, the following are
suggested in their respective fields. AmlcANT LIBRARY Ass'N, THE FIRST FREEDOM
(Downs ed. 1960) (a general survey of the problem-a complete collection of ma-
terials) ; ERNST & SEAGLF, TO THE PURE . . . (1928) (history and background) ; Al-
pert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1938) (history) ;
Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38
MINN. L. REv. 295 (1954); Lockhard & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The
Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960) (a complete survey
of the legal climate to mid-1960).
836 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:834
cuse for another article on the subject is an endeavor to suggest some
concepts which might eliminate the untenable posture that the law has
adopted with respect to criminal obscenity. Before advancing these
ideas, some of the historical underbrush should be cleared away.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Common Law
Most courts treat an obscenity offense as though it were an act
malum in se, pernicious, and a deep affront to society. Under early
common law, however, no offense was committed by the publication of
a book or magazine containing sexual pictures or literature. In 1708,
in Regina v. Read,2° a gentleman was brought into criminal court for
the publication of a book entitled Fifteen Plagues of a Maidenhead.
The court held that such an act was "no offence at common law" but
punishable only in the Ecclesiastical Courts.2 In that case, Judge
Powell asserted the need for a law against such publications but refused
to create one by judicial legislation.22 Unfortunately, the English
courts changed the law twenty years later and decided that obscenity
was punishable on the ground that it was an offense against religion
and religion was part of the common law.' The crime was subse-
quently incorporated into American jurisprudence.
2 4
B. Early Tests
Regina v. Hicklin 25 produced the first and classic test of what
constitutes obscenity. Chief Justice Cockburn held the test to be
"whether the tendency of the matter charged . . . is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and
into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." 28 The criterion,
as can readily be seen, is as wide as the interpreter cares to make it.
Under that test, much of what can be found today in almost any neigh-
2 0 Fortescue 98, 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (ICB. 1708).
21 Ibid.
2 2 "There is no law to punish it, I wish there were, but we cannot make law;
it indeed tends to the corruption of good manners, but that is not sufficient for us to
punish." Id. at 99, 92 Eng. Rep. at 777.
2
3Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (KB. 1727). For detail see
STRAUS, THE UNSPEAKABLE CURL (1927).
24 Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. 91 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1815), involved
exhibition of an indecent picture which was held punishable even'in the absence of
statute on the authority of Rex v. Curl, supra note 23; Commonwealth v. Holmes,
17 Mass. 336 (1821) (a book).
25 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
26 Id. at 371.
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borhood library was at one time or another banned as obscene. Theo-
dore Dreiser's An American Tragedy,2" Boccaccio's Decameron,28
Casanova's Homecoming 29 and The Well of Loneliness, ° and Lillian
Smith's Strange Fruit 8 1 were all banned.
An important break in" this test, which could ban anything from
the Bible to the Koran, came in United States v. Dennett.32 A remark-
able woman, Mary Ware Dennett, had written a pamphlet entitled
The Sex Side of Life for her own children, aged eleven and fourteen.
It was an excellent piece of work and there were many demands for it.
It was published in the Medical Review of Reviews and reprinted in
pamphlet form. For using the United States mails to supply requests
for the pamphlet, Mrs. Dennett was convicted in the Southern District
of New York. Judges Augustus N. Hand, Swan, and Chase of the
Second Circuit reversed the conviction. The court in effect accepted
the Hicklin test, yet decided that "an accurate exposition of the relevant
facts of the sex side of life in decent language and in manifestly serious
and disinterested spirit cannot ordinarily be regarded as obscene." I
This case laid the foundation for Judge Wolsey's significant decision
in United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," "I in which the issue
was whether James Joyce's Ulysses was admissible into the United
States despite customs prohibitions against obscene literature. The
court cleared the book on the theory that it should not be judged by its
effect upon "any person" into whose hands it may fall-the Hicklin
test-, but rather that it must "be tested by the court's opinion as to
its effect on a person with average sex instincts-what the French
would call l'homme moyen sensuel-who plays, in this branch of legal
inquiry, the same role of hypothetical reagent as does the 'reasonable
man' in the law of torts and 'the man learned in the art' on questions
of invention in patent law." " The court also set forth the corollary
rule that a work or book must be tested as an entirety, not with an eye
to individual passages.
At this point the law rested for many years. Several jurisdictions
refused to follow the enlightened view and continued to accept the
27 See Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930).
28 See Commonwealth v. McCance, 164 Mass. 162, 41 N.E. 133 (1895), in which
a lower court conviction was reversed primarily for lack of specificity in the grand
jury indictment
29 People v. Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 203 N.Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct 1924).
30 People v. Friede, 133 Misc. 611, 233 N.Y. Supp. 565 (Magis. Ct 1929).
31 Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
82 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
33 Id. at 569.
345 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
35 F. Supp. at 184.
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Hicklin test. 6  There were attempts to offer other standards. Prob-
ably the most noteworthy attempt was that of Judge Bok " who, faced
with a case involving an indictment of a book seller for selling such
material as the Studs Lonigan Trilogy, Faulkner's Sanctuary, and
Caldwell's God's Little Acre, formulated the clear and present danger
test. He suggested that if "the commission or the imminence of the
commission of criminal behavior resulting from the reading of a book"
could be shown, then that book could be regarded as obscene. 8
C. The Model Penal Code Test
In 1957, the American Law Institute promulgated in the Model
Penal Code a tentative model obscenity law. Unfortunately, it came at a
time when the law was in a state of flux and the Institute's offering in
the interest of clarifying a confused situation served only to compound
the confusion. Without much clarification, the Institute carried its
material over to a proposed final draft in 1962.
The ALI states: "Material is obscene if, considered as a whole,
its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or
morbid interest, in nudity, sex or excretion, and if in addition it goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or rep-
resenting such matters." "' The major difficulty with this definition
is that it serves to perpetuate the myth that obscenity is an absolute.
As stated by Professor Gellhorn,
Those who urge increased repression of allegedly obscene
books are of course convinced that "obscenity" can be iden-
tified. In reality, however, the word does not refer to a thing
so much as to a mood. It is a variable. Its dimensions are
fixed in part by the eye of the individual beholder and in part
by a generalized opinion that shifts with time and place.40
After an attempt at definition which actually defines nothing, the
ALI then says that the appeal "shall be judged with reference to
ordinary adults unless it appears . .. to be designed for children
36 See, e.g., King v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 741, 233 S.W.2d 522 (1950);
Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930); State v. Becker,
364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W.2d 383 (1954) ; Commonwealth v. Donadney, 167 Pa. Super.
611, 75 A.2d 440 (1950).
3 T Commonwealth v. Gorden, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (Q.S. Philadelphia County
1949).
as Id. at 155.
39MODEL PENAL CODE §251.4(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
40 GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 55 (1956).
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or other specially susceptible audience." 41 In other words, the
major thrust of the ALI's position is the intended audience. But
at best the material is to be judged by its effect upon "ordinary adults."
This is a typical "man on the street" test that would, if followed, reduce
all art and literature to the level of "ordinary adults." However, the
ALI test is not meant to go this far since it makes a broad range of
evidence admissible, much of which necessarily must go beyond the
effect upon an ordinary adult.'
The ALI also sets up an exception which completely undercuts
the basic test-any person can disseminate material (otherwise obscene)
so long as it is "non-commercial dissemination to personal associates
.. " ." 4 Consequently, under the ALI test the benevolent lodge
might have a stag film embodying hard-core pornography and no crime
would be committed unless there was an admission charge. It scarcely
seems appropriate to make the profit motive,44 at least in this country,
the difference between a crime and a lawful act. In a comment the
ALI implies that since science is uncertain whether the reading of
erotica has any effect on behavior, we must follow a "conservative penal
policy" " and punish the dissemination of what might be regarded as
obscenity. However, since we are interested, as the ALI indicates,
primarily in potential criminal misbehavior, by what theory do we
conclude that if an adult shows stag films in his home to a group of
friends there will be no resultant criminal behavior unless he makes a
charge for the privilege of viewing the film? Certainly, nowhere in this
field has anyone suggested that this could possibly be a factor.
46
4 1 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The Supreme
Court squarely rejected the Code on this point in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,
370 U.S. 478 (1962), in which the material was unquestionably designed to appeal
to the prurient interests of homosexuals. For example, the Government introduced
evidence that the publisher endeavored to obtain photographs of males who were
"'truck driver types' already cleaned up, showered and ready for bed." Record, p. 89
(Government's exhibit G.) ; see 16 VAND. L. REv. 251, 257 (1962).
42 SeeMODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
431d. § 251.4(3) (b).
44 The final draft of § 251.4 (3) (b) refers to "non-commercial dissemination." In
the early drafts this was described as dissemination "not for gain." See MODEL PENAL.
CODE § 207.10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957). Presumably they are equivalent, since the
comments indicate no intention to make a change at this point except perhaps as a
"minor verbal change." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4, comment at 240 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
4 5 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, comment 1, at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
4GThere is language in State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St 22, 28, 179 N.E.2d 777,
781 (1962), that could be stretched to support the theory:
Les Amants (The Lovers) was not hard-core pornography, i.e., filth for
filth's sake. It was worse. It was filth for money's sake. The producers,
distributors and exhibitors evidenced so little responsibility in connection
therewith that they have no right to assert constitutional guarantees which
require a high degree of responsibility from those who seek their protection.
This is especially apropos of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.
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In general, the ALI analysis adds little to the present state of the
law but can, and has,47 confused those endeavoring to follow its
suggestions.48
D. The Modern Test
In Roth v. United States,49 the Supreme Court theoretically created
a new test for obscenity. The Court held that "obscene material is
material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient in-
terest," " which the Court defined to be "material having a tendency
to excite lustful thoughts." "' Or, stated another way, "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
ifiterest." 52
To attorneys and judges who make daily decisions about whether
a book, photograph, magazine, or article is obscene, this test is unsatis-
factory. Are "contemporary community standards" those prevalent in
the local area, the state, or the United States? 53
Although the Court failed to establish a satisfactory test of what
constitutes obscenity, it did set forth two criteria necessary to sustain
the constitutionality of a conviction. These are that the material must
be treated as a unit rather than judged on the basis of isolated or indi-
vidual parts or passages, and that it must be examined with regard
to its effect upon average or normal adults and not on how it might
impinge upon the young or immature. In Manual Enterprises, Inc. v.
47 The Supreme Court in Roth purported to adopt many of the American Law
Institute ideas. However, see Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in which he indicates
the Court's confusion on this point. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 499-500
(1957). Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity Law: Portents From Recent Supreme Court
Decisions and Proposals of the American Law Institute in the Model Penal Code,
29 PA. B.A.Q. 8, 11 (1957), says that the Supreme Court "may have been trying to
bring existing law up to the level of the Model Penal Code by the tour de force of
declaring that it was already there."
48 For the best justification for the position of the ALI see Schwartz, Moral
Offenses and the Penal Code, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 669, 677-81 (1963). The author
states that the Institute is endeavoring to change the normal crime from one of
the "sin of obscenity" to one of commercial exploitation of the "weakness for titillation
by pornography." Id. at 677. From the viewpoint of a practitioner the ALI intro-
duces more uncertainties than it eliminates.
49 354 U.S. 476 (1957). For an analysis see Kalven, The Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity, in 1960 SuPaRE CouRT REv Ew 1 (Kurland ed.).
50 354 U.S. at 487.
51 Id. at 487 n.20.
52 Id. at 489.
53 For a thorough critique of the Roth text see Lockhart & McClure, supra note
19, at 49-58. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962), indicates
that the standard for obscenity in the mails "is a national standard of decency."
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Day,54 at least a part of the Supreme Court added an additional and
significant criterion: that the material be patently offensive.
Thus, the Court's statements on obscenity make it appear that
obscene material is an appeal "to prurient interests," which, freely
translated, in all probability means that it relates to the sexual or the
scatalogical; the material must be considered as a whole; it must be
patently offensive. Testing any specific item against this three-pronged
test, can a lawyer decide whether it is obscene? The answer must be
in the negative. Thus, attention must turn to the pragmatic, i.e., what
the Supreme Court has done rather than what it has said.
II. THE CONDUCT OF THE SUPREME COURT
Justices Black and Douglas have asserted that all publications are
entitled to constitutional protection and that punishment should not be
permitted for obscenity.55 The position of these two Justices simplifies
the problem considerably since it would eliminate the legal concept of
obscenity. For most of the Justices mere nudity does not constitute
obscenity; the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision that a col-
lection of nudist and art student publications containing nude photo-
graphs was obscene.56 The pictures in that case involved noncultist
nudity and the normal argument that the nudist magazines were espous-
ing an idea was probably absent, for, as the trial court stated: "although
an avowed purpose of the books is to explain the nudist movement, its
principles and its practices, there are relatively very few photographs
of the mixed groups of all ages which ordinarily would be found in a
nudist park. The great preponderance of the illustrations depicts
54 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Mr. Justice Harlan announced the decision of the court
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the opinion. Mr. Justice Black concurred in the result
without opinion. The Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and Douglas concurred in
the reversal but on the ground that the Postmaster General had no legal authority
to make nonmailability determinations at all. Mr. Justice Clark dissented. Justices
White and Frankfurter took no part in the case. For discussions see Rossman,
Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 48 A.B.A.J. 1071, 1073 (1962); The
Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54, 125-30 (1962) ; 27 ALBANY L. REV.
127 (1963); 29 BROOKLYN L. REv. 325 (1963); 24 MONT. L. REv. 65 (1962); 17
RUTGERS L. REV. 213 (1962); 30 TENN. L. RFv. 291 (1963); 16 VAND. L. Rxv. 251
(1962). See generally Fleishman, Obscenity and Post Office Censorship, 22 LAw
IN TRANsriON 222 (1963).
55 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 509 (1957) (Douglas & Black, JJ., con-
curring. These Justices suggest a possible exception when the material "has an
impact on action that the government can control." Id. at 511. This is close to
Judge Bok's position in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (C.P. Phila-
delphia County 1949). Justice Douglas continues his near-the-extreme position in
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 167-69 (1959), but Justice Black goes all the
way-that there cannot be constitutional censorship of obscenity. Id. at 157-59. The
Chief Justice indicates a sympathetic view since he believes that the primary problem
is: "The conduct of the defendant" rather than the "obscenity of a book or picture."
Id. at 495.
56 Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957), reversing 247 F.2d 148 (9th
Cir. 1957).
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shapely, well-developed young women appearing in the nude, mostly
in front exposures." " The principle that nudity alone cannot be
equated with obscenity was underlined by the Court in Sunshine Book
Co. v. Summerfield,58 in which the pictures went even further, since
they showed both male and female genitalia and pubic hair. The Court
has also held that neither magazines and pictures deliberately intended to
excite homosexuals " nor a motion picture entitled The Game of Love
containing "a series of illicit sexual intimacies and acts" and a graphic
portrayal of sexual relations, seductions, and nudity "with nothing
omitted except those sexual consummations which are plainly suggested
and meaningfully omitted" 60 is obscene.6 In only one of these cases
did the Court reverse and remand for reconsideration by the lower
court.6 2  In all the rest the Court reversed and decided the case.
One general interpretation of the three-cornered test plus the
actual decisions of the Court is that today only hard-core pornography
is obscene. 3 To some extent this only changes the form of the ques-
tion because we must now ask what is "hard-core pornography"? "
Nevertheless, a considerable amount has been gained in the solution
of the problems facing attorneys who must decide matters for pub-
57 United States v. 4200 Copies Int'l Journal, 134 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Wash.
1955).
58355 U.S. 372 (1958) (per curiam), reversing 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
affirming 128 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1955).
59 One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1957).
6OTimes Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1957),
reversed, 355 U.S. 35 (1958).
GlTimes Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1958), reversing 244 F.2d
432 (7th Cir. 1957).
62In Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957), the Court "reversed and
remanded" for further consideration.
63 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rxv. 5, 60 (1960) ; Note, 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 103 (1962).
The court so held in People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d
681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961) (constitutional obscenity is only ". . . what may prop-
erly be termed 'hard-core pornography'"). See also McClure, Obscenity and the Law,
56 Am. LIBRARY A. BULL. 806, 810 (1962) ("Obscenity censorship is restricted by
the federal constitution to hard core pornography. All else enjoys constitutional
protection.") ; 76 HARv. L. REv. 1498 (1963); Note, 39 N.D.L. REv. 308, 312-13
(1963).
64 There have been many attempts to define hard core pornography. See IoN-
HAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 178-240 (1959); LAWRENCF PORNOGRAPHY
AND OBSCENITY 74-77 (1953) ("Pornography is the attempt to insult sex, to do dirt
on it.") ; Mead, Sex and Censorship in Contemporary Society, in NEW WORLD WRITING
7, 23 (1953) ("Pornography does not lead to laughter; it leads to deadly serious
pursuit of sexual satisfaction divorced from personality and from every other
meaning.").
This writer believes that the distinction between "hard-core pornography" and
"soft-core" or non-hard-core is a pleasant exercise in semantics but will never have
any value in the law.
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lishers, courts that must decide cases as a matter of constitutional
judgment, and district attorneys who must make a preliminary judg-
ment finding.
No form of nudity in reasonably good taste will be found obscene.65
No serious writing would seem to be obscene regardless of how inti-
mately the details of sex are verbalized, provided that offensive four
letter words are not employed.66 That is not to say that the use of the
four letter words ipso facto renders any item obscene. On the contrary,
it is probably accurate to say that the use of these is irrelevant. How-
ever, a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals 67 gives
pause to a conclusion that would ignore the existence of four letter
words. It is one of the fields still in the no-man's land of obscenity.
Finally, it is difficult to conceive of any motion picture, not patently
offensive, being regarded as constitutionally obscene. After the Su-
preme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals in Lady Chat-
terly's Lover,"5 it was accused of "endorsing adultery" 69 and joining a
world conspiracy to subvert the morals of our land.7" But the Court
survived and struck the cruelest blow of all to the Comstocks-the
Justices added a constitutional requirement that punishment in obscenity
cases be limited to defendants who had knowledge of the obscene con-
tents of the material. 1
III. OBSCENE TO WHOM?
Assuming a workable test for obscenity, an important question is
who applies the standard. For many years it was assumed that the
question of obscenity was a question of fact to be found by the jury,
72
65 Nudist motion pictures have been held not obscene. Excelsior Pictures Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 182 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1960); Commonwealth v. Moniz, 338
Mass. 442, 155 N.E.2d 762 (1959); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §207.10, comment 8
(Tent Draft No. 6, 1957).
66 See Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.DN.Y. 1959).
67People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 126, 192 N.E.2d 713, 717, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7
(1963) (dictum).
6s Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
69 Congressman Clare E. Hoffman (R., Mich.) in N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1959,
p. 31, col. 8.
70 Benedict, The "Lady Chatterley's Lover" Case, American Mercury, Jan.
1960, p. 3.
71 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
72See People v. Williamson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 734, 735 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). This
produced an interesting problem such as that presented in Commonwealth v. Friede,
271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930), involving Dreiser's An American Tragedy, in
which the court refused to permit the introduction of the entire book into evidence
on the theory that it was too long to have it read to the jury. That enough copies
might be introduced so that the jurors could read it themselves was not considered.
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or in administrative proceedings by the fact finder.7" In these situa-
tions there was little room for subtlety, and a test, of necessity, had
to be broad enough to be capable of complete comprehension, applica-
tion, and conclusion by the man on the street. It was the type of test
that handled material with a shovel rather than tweezers.
Happily for those interested in freedom from censorship, that
era is gone. It has been clear for decades that the Supreme Court
will not permit constitutional rights to be invaded by the guise of a
conclusory finding of fact. As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "espe-
cially in cases arising under the Due Process Clause is it important to
distinguish between issues of fact that are here foreclosed and issues
which, though cast in the form of determinations of fact, are the very
issues to review for which this court sits." " And in Roth Mr. Justice
Harlan stated:
I. do not think that reviewing courts can escape this responsi-
bility by saying that the trier of facts, be it a jury or a judge,
has labeled the question matter as "obscene", for, if "ob-
scenity" is to be suppressed, the question whether a particular
work is of that character involves not really an issue of fact
but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensi-
tive and delicate kind.75
This theory is now well accepted and the courts are deciding
obscenity questions without endeavoring to escape responsibility by
sending them to a jury.70 Although the matter is for the courts and
there is a string of precedents from the Supreme Court, the state of
the law, as exemplified by the Tropic of Cancer cases, is one of con-
siderable confusion.
IV. THE Tropic of Cancer CASES
Tropic of Cancer by Henry Miller was the first book of a serious
nature to be published in light of the climate created by the Supreme
Court in its per curiam decisions of 1957-1958. The Grove Press,
73 See PAUL & SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP (1961); Paul, The Post Office
and Non-Mailability of Obscenity: An Historical Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 44 (1961) ;
Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some Problems of Federal Censor-
ship, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 214 (1957).
7 4 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). The
obscenity cases technically arise under the Due Process clause. In Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Court brought the protections of the first amendment
under the wing of the fourteenth and thereby set the stage for subsequent invalidating
of state obscenity statutes by the United States Supreme Court. See Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 345 U.S. 495 (1952).
7 5 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S., 476, 497-98 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76 See People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681,
216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961) ; cases cited notes 11-13 supra; Bunis v. Conway, 17 A.D.2d
207, 234 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1962). But see Tralins v. Gerstein, 151 So. 2d 19 (D. Ct.
App. Fla. 1963).
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Inc. decided that no book of serious intent and purpose could be re-
garded as obscene.7  Consequently, Tropic of Cancer was published
in hard cover and distributed throughout the United States and subse-
quently reprinted in soft cover for full distribution on almost every
newsstand and drug store in the country.
The book was first published in Paris in 1934 and for a long time
was regarded as beyond the pale in the United States. However, it
was frequently brought back into the United States by both literary
scholars and collectors of what was then regarded as pornography.
The book has no plot and it is primarily a series of partially connected
episodes in the life of an American living in Paris in the early 1930's.
The major problem to the American mores is that in describing sex
episodes the author omits no detail and employs earthy Anglo-Saxon
four-letter words without hyphens or asterisks.
The book was attacked throughout the country and received
mixed reactions in the lower courts.7 However, it was held not
obscene by the courts of last resort of Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and
California.7" It appeared that the courts were well on the way to
rounding out the definition of obscenity so that an attorney could
confidently assert that no book of a serious nature could be regarded
as constitutionally obscene. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, by a four-to-three decision, decided: "It is not relevant that
we think that the book at many places is repulsive, vulgar, and grossly
offensive in the use of four letter words, and in the detailed and coarse
statement of sexual episodes." " The court concluded that since the
book "has serious purpose" it cannot be held obscene because it falls
within the protection of the first amendment. The majority specif-
ically stated for purposes of any further appeal that there should be
"no doubt that this case has been decided solely upon the Federal
issue." 81 The following year the book reached the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin, which, in a rather similar decision,' also found the book
77 Affidavit of Barney Rosset, principal editor of Grove Press, Inc., in Grove
Press, Inc. v. Callissi, 208 F. Supp. 580 (D.N.J. 1962): "Grove Press concluded
that there was no longer any legal impediment to the publication of Tropic of Cancer
in this country."
78 See cases cited notes 7, 9, 10, 14 supra.
79 Cases cited notes 11-13 mepra.
8oAttorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 184 N.E.2d 328, 334
(Mass. 1962).
81 Id. at 335. A minority, including the Chief Justice, filed a vigorous dissent on
the theory that these Justices could not believe the thesis that a book pitched at such
a "low level" could possibly become "endowed with constitutional protection." Id.
at 336.8 2 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 121 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. 1963). The minority
followed the dissent in Massachusetts, expressing the thought that because the book
was "saturated with filth in its substance and in its expression" it had no right to
constitutional protection. Id. at 556.
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entitled to constitutional protection. The majority decided that
because the book commanded serious attention as a literary work it
could not be found obscene. When, six weeks later, California joined
the parade with a thoughtful, well-reasoned, and unanimous decision,8
the rule could almost be said to have been "well established" that a
serious piece of literature could not possibly be obscene.
Then the New York Court of Appeals handed down a surprise
decision in New York v. Fritch.4 Faced with a truly difficult set of
facts, the court found the book obscene. In Wisconsin, Massachusetts,
and California the cases had arisen on declaratory judgments. It
would seem to have been relatively simple for a court in an abstract
problem involving no punishment to have found the book obscene.
The New York case, however, involved a criminal trial in which the
defendants were convicted for a violation of the state penal law. After
conviction by a jury, the county court reversed the conviction and
dismissed on constitutional grounds. On appeal, the majority of the
court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that the
book was not entitled to constitutional protection. The majority
opinion held the book obscene regardless of whether it has "substan-
tial literary merit." Significantly, the court stated that it would "not
adopt a rule of law which states that obscenity is suppressible but
that well-written obscenity is not." '
A major fallacy of the opinion is the assumption that obscenity
is an absolute. Regardless of who writes it, for what purpose, in what
context, in what place or time, the New York court believes that it can
detect obscenity. The court stumbled into a second fallacy when it
declared that its concern was whether the material appeals to the
prurient interest of the average person in the contemporary community.
However, it is submitted that the "average person" test should not
refer to the man on the street but rather, as Judge Woolsey in Ulysses
intended, to the equivalent of the patent law's "man learned in the
art." 86 In the obscenity area this would be a man learned in the
particular field under consideration. In literature it would be the
critic, the professor, the publisher. In the movie field it would be the
83 Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
8 New York v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
85 Id. at 126, 192 N.E.2d at 717, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 7. One is reminded of the
Massachusetts decision on Dreiser's American Tragedy, Commonwealth v. Friede,
271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930), in which the court states: "[Elven assuming
great literary excellence, artistic worth and an impelling moral lesson in this story,
there is nothing essential to the history of the life of its principal character that
would be lost if these passages were omitted which the jury found were obscene,
indecent and manifestly tending to corrupt the morals of youth." Id. at 321, 171
N.E. at 474.
6 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y.
1933).
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reviewer, the producer, the craftsman. But properly it should not be
the man on the street'7 The New York court, however, specifically
rejected this concept, stating:
It does not follow, then, that because an alleged work of
literature does not appeal to the prurient interest of a small
group of intellectuals that it is not obscene under the prurient
interest, or for that matter any other legal test of obscenity.
This would permit the substitution of the opinions of authors
and critics for those of the average person in the contempo-
rary community. The fact that a few literary figures have
commented favorably on this book and have lent it their
prestige does not expunge from its pages the flagrantly
obscene and patently offensive matter which dominates the
book as a whole.8"
This is a curious reversal of logic. Just as a publication cannot be
held obscene simply because it has an unusual effect upon a particular
segment of the community, "such as children, the pious, or the
prudish," this court would not test the absence of obscenity "by the
lack of impact it has on the literary community." 8
V. VARIABLE OBSCENITY
Obscenity, the New York Court of Appeals notwithstanding, is
not an absolute; it has many variables. The major variable is the
mode of communication being employed. There is little doubt that a
nudist cinema admitting adults only is today constitutionally protected.
However, a life size still color photograph of one of the nudes in the
same picture plastered in front of the theatre would probably not be
protected in most courts.
87A case which clearly demonstrates the fallacy of using the literal "average
man" test is State v. Mahoning Valley Distrib. Agency, 116 Ohio App. 57, 186 N.E.2d
631 (1962), in which the court held a book, Sex Life of a Cop, obscene, rejecting
"expert!' testimony, stating:
The evidence submitted in this case is voluminous (1,063 pages) and con-
sists of long drawn out testimony by "experts." None of these witnesses
qualified, in our opinion, as experts on the prurient interests of the average
person in the community. Each may have been an "expert" in his own field,
such as teaching, preaching, etc. But we strongly doubt that they were
experts in the field in which they were giving "expert" testimony. At best,
they were giving their own opinions, gathered in the limited field of their
own professions and experience as to what they thought. The average police-
man, judge, or general medical practitioner would probably have come much
closer to being an expert.
Id. at 59, 186 N.E.2d at 632.
88 13 N.Y.2d at 125, 192 N.E.2d at 717, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
89 Ibid.
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The reason for the difference goes back to basic principles. Every
decision involving obscenity demands a judicial balancing of interests. 0
On the one hand is the interest in the freedom of communication of
ideas specifically protected by the first amendment. On the other hand
are the rights of individual people to be protected, if they so desire,
from the distasteful impact of material which is offensive to their sense
of sexual morality. There are, of course, subsidiary protections of
other interests. Since some people believe that certain sexual material
may damage the moral fiber of youth,9 parents and those in charge of
youth have the right to keep their charges free from what they may
regard as the corrupting or debasing influence of certain types of sexual
literature or pictures. No attorney would argue today that there is a
constitutional right to sell pictures of copulating nudes to high school
children.92  Daily newspapers of general circulation, the billboard com-
panies, and others who spread their wares before the general public,
have a duty to refrain from spreading material which in the normal
course of events must be forced before the eyes of many segments of
the community who would be deeply offended by it. However, a
specialized magazine such as the typical "girlie" magazine, the nudist
magazine, the magazine for homosexuals, or any book, for that matter,
presents a totally different problem. No woman of delicate sensibilities
will be offended if she does not seek out the material. Children may
not have it if their parents are sufficiently protective. 93 It is both
simple and constitutional to prohibit the dissemination of such material
to children. In the movie field, it is certainly permissible to make it a
crime for a proprietor to admit a minor or anyone under a certain
90 In McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 121 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. 1963), the majority
used a "balancing of factors" to find nonobscenity. However, the factors were not
those suggested in the text above. The court weighed the material under consideration
against "the purposes, ideas or artistic quality of the work." Id. at 550.
91 See Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-
Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MiNN. L. REv. 1009, 1038-39 (1962).
A fine summary of the state of scientific evidence on this point is found in a concur-
ring opinion by Judge Jerome Frank in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 812-19
(2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 345 U.S. 476 (1957). See also McKEON, MERTON & GEHORN,
THE FREEDOm To READ 71-78 (1957). It is surprising that although the proponents
of the idea that sexual material causes juvenile delinquency are both loquacious and
convinced, see, e.g., Hearings on Obscene Matter Sent Through the Mail Before the
Subcommittee on Postal Operations of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1962), there is a dearth of evidence that the
a priori assumptions of the proponents have any scientific basis. Unquestionably there
are a great many factors causing juvenile delinquency-some of them surprising.
See, e.g., Litwack, An Examination of Ten Significant Differences Between Juvenile
Recidivists and Non-Recidivists, 55 J. OF ED. RESEARCH 132 (1961).
92 See Mathews v. State, 99 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918
(1958) (defendant convicted of showing obscene pictures to a 12-year-old girl).
93 "An alert parent will find sensible means of keeping her children from reading
books for which they are not yet ready-without resorting to bans and boycotts."
Goodman, How To Deal With Obscene Books, Redbook, Nov. 1957.
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mature age for certain types of shows-a matter which could be decided
by the state legislature."'
The adoption of such a solution would, in effect, eliminate obscen-
ity as applied to any adult media not embodied in a form which in the
normal course of events would impinge upon broad segments of the
community without individual consent. We all must read the news-
papers, but we do not have to read Tropic of Cancer.5  We cannot
escape the billboards, but we do not have to go into the movies if we
do not like nudist films.
This theory, carried to the extreme, brings us to the problem of
"hard-core pornography." We have the French postcards and stag
films to consider. The pure and unadulterated acceptance of the test
submitted would also entitle these to constitutional protection. It is
doubtful whether most courts are ready for this step. Yet, in a recent
case a court faced the problem and did not flinch. In United States v.
31 Photographs,96 the Kinsey Institute had endeavored to import for
scientific study photographs unquestionably of the hard-core pornog-
raphy type. The Bureau of Customs refused to permit their importation
because if anything was "obscene" under the Tariff Act these photo-
graphs were. However, the court ruled against the Department of
Justice, which did not take an appeal. The decision is regarded as an
example of the theory of variable obscenity, i.e., that obscenity is really
a descriptive characteristic referring to the "chameleonic quality of
material that changes with time, place, and circumstances." 97 It is
contrasted, of course, to a theory that "obscenity is an inherent char-
acteristic of obscene material, so that material categorized as obscene
is always obscene at all times and places and in all circumstances
. ... ,, The theory of variable obscenity and the decision in
Kinsey are directly at variance with the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals. But it is in direct line with the test here espoused-
9 See Note, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental Film
Censorship by Age Classification, 69 YALE L.J. 141 (1959). Such legislation must be
drawn carefully and contain reasonable limitations. An automatic age 21 limitation
may be unreasonable. Cf. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172
F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
95 In the McCauley case, the court comes close to using this point as a criterion
for decision, saying that much of the language in the book was offensive and the
words were classified according to the dictionary as vulgar or obscene. The court
concludes: "Although some of these words would not be tolerated in our society if..,-' "
inflicted on unwilling listeners, an offended reader need only close the book in order
to escape." 121 N.W2d at 551.
96156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), 7 KIx. L. Rxv. 216 (1958).
97 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 68 (1960).
98 Ibid.
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that in order to remove any form of communication from the general
constitutional protection, the harm threatened 9 must be extreme.
Under Kinsey, we must conclude that in the abstract even French
postcards and stag films are not obscene. 00 A sexologist club or a
psychiatrists' association exhibiting stag films for purposes of analysis
or testing pulse and pressure effect or post-associative ideas should be
protected. A backroom showing for high school youths, however, can
constitutionally be banned. What of the benevolent lodge which fea-
tures such a film to attract membership to an otherwise dull meeting?
It is dubious whether there is any overriding public interest which
demands that the leaders of the organization be punished. Those who
attend do so with full knowledge of what to expect, and those who
object can stay away. No one has ever demonstrated that exposure to
the stimulus of a sex film has caused anyone to commit rape or any
other misconduct. There is much loose talk that it "can or might" do
so, but whatever scientific evidence there is on the subject points in the
other direction.
Although there are many respected authorities who believe that
there should be no such doctrine as obscenity,' it may be that the
19 Not the degree of the obscenity (if "degree" is a proper word for measuring
relativity of obscenity).
10A group no less distinguished than the American Law Institute reaches the
same conclusion but bases its decision upon the commercial nature of the exhibition.
In this Article the suggested criterion is: Does the "obscenity" impinge involuntarily
upon any person or group? The ALI asks, does it do so commercially? MODEL
PENAL CODE § 251.4(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
1 oFor example, Justices Black and Douglas, see Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 508-14 (1957); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155-60, 167-69 (1959).
One of the best arguments against any form of censorship, either before or after the
fact, is found in HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AMERcA 65 (1960) :
Many-sided though it is, censorship possesses the one unifying emotional
response of fear-fear of a world which would, if we faced it, threaten us
with the task of becoming individual human beings. Our blushes and smirks
and self-righteous denunciations of four-letter words, lewd pictures, and all
the other paraphernalia of obscenity and pornography are little more than
the attempt to feel noble when we are really being absurd. And we pass
on through generations this legacy of fear. All the muck and dirt which
pornographic literature and photography can pour out into our bookstores
or onto our newsstands is trivial beside the real damage to the human soul-
the systematic production of frightened and inept men and women which
goes under the name of censorship.
Id. at 65. See the incisive opinion by Judge Shapiro, People v. Birch, 243 N.Y.S2d
525, 532-33 (Sup. Ct. 1963), in which the court, after analyzing a series of books
which deal with "The March from Puberty to Prostitution," concludes:
To censor these books, by law, would be flowering the seed of the repression
of free expression. If books such as these are to be suppressed, it should not
be done by law, but by the starvation of those who write and distribute them
through the failure of the public to purchase them. Education, and not
judicial legislation, is the answer. In the words of Plato (The Republic,
Ch. XI) "It would be silly, I think, to make laws on these matters." Volun-
tary censorship, exercised by the would-be purchaser of such material, is the
essence of a free society,-a soqiety which has more to lose from unbridled
censorship than from prohibiting the publication of "gamy" books. That is
one of the main differences between worlds that are open and worlds that are
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country is not ready for that extreme position. If not, we should ex-
plore the interest that is protected when a court holds an item to be
obscene. No responsible court, in modern times, has held or asserted
that an obscene item is dangerous because it might incite the reader or
viewer to perform a criminal act.1"' The only interest left to be pro-
tected, therefore, is the individual's right to be free from involuntary
contact with morally offensive material. There are, of course, those
who would protect their neighbor's and everyone else's morals. But
this is certainly going too far. As Professor Henkin says, "it is time
to begin to examine-if only in order to justify-the right of constitu-
tional government to legislate morality which has no secular, utilitarian,
or social purpose." 103 If prohibition of the dissemination of material
on the ground of obscenity is based on the protection of someone's
morals, the significance of that interest can best be evaluated in the
balancing of interests test. As a leading trial lawyer in this field has
observed, what is freely permitted on the stage or in an expensive hard
cover book will be censored in the movies or in a cheap paperback.
He explains, "The assumption of the censor is that if a man can afford
to spend $8.50 for a theatre ticket, then he's sophisticated and won't
be corrupted by what he sees on the stage. But the people who see
films in a neighborhood movie-house, where the price of admission may
be a dollar, are presumably in need of protection." 104
In further demonstration that obscenity is a variable, we have only
to point to the factor of time. It might be said that time cures all
obscenity. Judge Learned Hand, more than half a century ago, sig-
nificantly observed this point while reluctantly sustaining an indict-
ment for the publication of a book that today would scarcely cause the
closed. In the final analysis we must trust in the good sense of the people.
They should be the sole judges of whether they are going to be literary
gourmets, gourmands, or gluttons for what is "one reader's obscenity is an-
other's artistry" (N.Y. Times, editorial, 8/24/63).
Compare the fear of the intellectual that art can never be uncensored. Jenkins,
The Laisser-Faire [sic] Theory of Artistic Censorship, 5 J. OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS
71 (1944).
102See Judge Jerome Frank concurring in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796,
812 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 345 U.S. 476 (1957) :
To date there exist, I think, no thorough-going studies by competent persons
which justify the conclusions that normal adults' reading or seeing of the
"obscene" probably induces anti-social conduct. Such competent studies as
have been made do conclude that so complex and numerous are the causes
of sexual vice that it is impossible to assert with any assurance that "ob-
scenity" represents a ponderable causal factor in sexually deviant adult
behavior.
Also, Judge Frank quoting New York City's famous Mayor Walker to the effect
that "he had never heard of a woman seduced by a book."
103 Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUm. L.
Rxv. 391, 414 (1963).
10 4 The Independent Oct 1963, p. 1, col. 3, quoting Ephraim London.
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lifting of an eyebrow. He said, "I question whether in the end men
will regard that as obscene which is honestly relevant to the adequate
expression of innocent ideas, and whether they will not believe that
truth and beauty are too precious to society at large to be mutilated in
the interests of those most likely to pervert them to base uses." 105
To see how correct Judge Hand was, we have only to go back to those
days when the highest court in Massachusetts banned with the same
legal barrier Elinor Glynn's novel Three Weeks and, in 1930, Dreiser's
An American Tragedy, despite the best efforts of Arthur Garfield Hayes
to defend it.'00
In the case of Dreiser it took a few years for the decision to fade
and for the book to become well accepted throughout the country, in-
cluding Massachusetts. Today the process is speeded up. It is prob-
ably why we have so many reversals in the obscenity field.'. 7  At the
time the material is considered in the trial court it may be that on the
tests then being used, namely the prevailing mores of that local com-
munity as interpreted by that court, the material is not ready for
acceptance. However, by the time the material goes through the gamut
of appeals, the mores of the people catch up to the material and it is
no longer obscene. We might note for example that in the 1958
Summerfield 108 case the trial court was considering a 1954 issue of a
nudist magazine. 9 The Supreme Court decided the same question
more than three years later. Who is to say that not much changed
except the temper of the times? 10
VI. THE AVERAGE MAN TEST
The foregoing test of balancing the significant interest of consti-
tutional protection for ideas against the harm caused to those members
of the community who are offended by sexual or scatological portrayals
does not totally eliminate the problem, but cuts it down to manageable
size. However, we must still determine what can be portrayed on
105 United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
106 See Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REv. 40,
54-55 (1938).
107 For reversals see cases cited, supra notes 1, 11, 12, 18, 32, 33, 56-61, 68, 71.
108 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958).
109 128 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1955).
110 In State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962), the defendant
was indicted in 1959. The case was argued before the United States Supreme Court
on March 26, 1963, and restored for reargument on April 29, 1963. 373 U.S. 901
(1963). It has not yet been reargued. See also State v. Wetzel, 173 Ohio St 16,
179 N.E.2d 773 (1962), in which defendant was convicted of an obscenity offense
committed on February 8, 1960. The appeals procedure then continued until the
conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. It continued on through the
United States Supreme Court. See Wetzel v. Ohio, 371 U.S. 62 (1962).
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television, in newspapers of general circulation, and similar mass media.
Here, the only test can be-is the material "patently offensive" to those
who know the media well? The effect on the man on the street must
be disregarded.
Two recent cases served to raise this issue sharply. In People v.
Finkelstein,"' book store owners were arrested for selling two allegedly
obscene books, Queen Bee and Garden of Evil. During trial, defense
counsel offered in evidence other publications for sale in adjacent book
stores "to indicate . . the current standard in the community, of
literature . . ." The trial court excluded the evidence because
"that is not the way standards are made," and on appeal, the conviction
was affirmed. The majority found the exclusion of the evidence proper
because the excluded books might be regarded as equally obscene by
the "average person" applying contemporary community standards.
The Supreme Court of California, however, arrived at a contrary con-
clusion holding that the exclusion of expert testimony or comparable
literature sold in the community was reversible error as a deprivation
of due process. 2
It is interesting that New York and California are following
basically divergent views throughout the entire field of obscenity.
Since "certain members of the Supreme Court of the United States and
experts in the field of obscenity appear to be leaning more and more
toward the position that the admissibility of comparable writings and/or
expert testimony as evidence of the community standards is a consti-
tutional guarantee," "' it seems clear that the New York Court of
Appeals will again have to accept the reversal of its position by the
Supreme Court."
4
If we accept the proposition that evidence of the state of the art
of the medium is permissible, whether by demonstrating comparable
material in circulation or by the testimony of the experts in that field, a
subsidiary problem arises. What of the case in which the prosecution
brings in three experts who testify that in the present state of the art
the material is "patently offensive" and the defense counters with four
experts who deny the allegation and testify that though the material is
new, novel, or experimental, it is not "patently offensive" under all of
M 11 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 309, 183 N.E.2d 661, 663-64, 666, 229 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371,
374, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 863 (1962), 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 337 (1963), 76 HAgv. L.
REv. 1498 (1963).
112hI re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 366 P.2d 305, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961).
"1312 DE PAUL L. REV. 337, 342 (1963).
114 As it was in Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S.
684 (1959). For a prediction that the Supreme Court will reverse the New York
Court in the Tropic of Cancer case see McClure, Obscenity and the Law, 56 AM.
LinRARy A. BULL. 806, 810 (1962).
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the circumstances? In every such case, assuming that there is honest
disagreement among the experts and it is not a sham concocted by the
defense, the material should receive the benefit of the doubt. This is
entirely in keeping with the underlying function and purpose of the
first amendment-to protect the freedom of the communicators to ex-
press new and novel ideas. There is presently sufficient drag on experi-
mentation and novelty by sponsors and advertisers who seek to offend
no one, so that courts should not add additional restraints. Already
inherent in some of our decisions is the thought that suppression of
borderline material is a violation of civil liberties. 5 It is a good
thought and deserves Supreme Court enunciation.
VII. OTHERWISE FUTILITY
We have long known that "equity will not perform a futile ges-
ture." "' It is submitted that neither should the courts of law. The
majority in the New York Court of Appeals which endeavored to sup-
press Tropic of Cancer was performing a truly futile act. Immediately
following Fritch, and continuing up until today, the people of New
York were free to purchase the Tropic of Cancer from almost any news-
stand or drug store in any metropolitan city in that state. The court's
decision ignores the economics and realities of the publication and dis-
tribution of books. The decision may slow up the publication of the
next similar type of book-not, incidentally, because of fear of punish-
ment, but rather because the publishers foot the bills for the obscenity
trials and too many legal controversies cost too much in legal expenses.
But once the book has been published, the decision of any court that
it is obscene hardly creates a ripple in the distributive process.
In brief, practically all nationally distributed paperback books are
published in quantities ranging from 100,000 to 1,000,000. The pub-
lisher turns them over mechanically to a national distributor, who in
turn forwards the books to eight hundred local and regional distribu-
tors that cover the fifty states. A small distributor in the sparsely
settled southwest will have a few hundred local outlets and a metro-
politan distributor will have several thousand. Hundreds of new titles
are distributed each week in this fashion throughout the country. Once
the distributive process has started it is practically impossible for any-
one to abort it with respect to a particular title.
115 See In re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241, 247 (E.D. La. 1960),
"Defendants [police officials] were after borderline material." Such conduct was
found "constitutionally objectionable."
116See Levine v. Black, 312 Mass. 242, 44 N.E.2d 774 (1942) (denial of an
injunction).
OBSCENITY
If, conceivably, some crusading attorney-general insisted on inter-
fering because he was armed with an opinion of the appellate court, he
might damage the distributional process in his state. But the reading
public would suffer the most. The economics of the business is such
that if books cannot be distributed mechanically and smoothly through
normal channels they cannot be published at all.
Facing this problem squarely we must conclude that when a court
declares a specific book obscene and endeavors to remove it from the
channels of reading commerce, it is performing an exercise in futility.
The point was well stated by the outstanding historian in this field
several decades ago when he said, "This business of suppression, usu-
ally only one forty-eighth effective at best, puts the judiciary and the
vice societies on their sorry nags as a band of Don Quixotes tilting at
windmills. The crusades may be fun for somebody but they are not
particularly sensible." "'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The time is overdue for our courts, and particularly the Supreme
Court, to adopt a fresh approach to the problem of obscenity so that we
may have a minimum of interference with the freedom guaranteed by
the first amendment and a maximum of certainty so that lawyers and
judges can reach intelligent conclusions without the feeling of trying
to run in quicksand. To accomplish this, every problem of obscenity
must be tested under the criterion of balancing the claim that the ma-
terial is obscene against the harm to the area of conduct protected by
the first amendment. Under this test, nothing is obscene in the ab-
stract. Practically nothing is obscene when it is channelled in the
direction of an adult audience on a purely voluntary basis. Material
which comes upon us involuntarily as in the newspapers or on tele-
vision must be screened so as not to insult the large number of people
in our midst who are offended."' The courts must make the decisions,
but the decisions must be based upon the "patent offensiveness" of the
material in the opinions of those who are knowledgeable about the state
of the medium. Such decisions must be based upon a clear and indubi-
table offensiveness. If the industry or art is divided, the material
117Alpert, Naughty, Naughty!, in AmmUcAN LBRARY Ass'N, THE FIRST FREE-
Dom 4, 8 (Downs ed. 1960).
11S The time might come, of course, when so few members of society are offended
by nudity, coarse language, and graphic sexual representation that even this form of
censorship may be removed. The bikini, modern psychiatric literature, etc., will pre-
vail over the almost superstitious attitudes of the prudish. But until that time the
harm to freedom of speech is probably slight compared to the outraged feelings of
the "offended" so that in mass media we must continue some limited censorship.
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acquires the protection of the first amendment for it is for this purpose
that the first amendment exists.
Finally, the courts must recognize that they are rendering decisions
in a dynamic field. That which is decided to be obscene today is ac-
cepted tomorrow and becomes a child morality tale the day after."'
Courts should not decide cases with an eye to today or even tomorrow
or this year. Material which is suppressed should, in the opinion of
the court, be that type of material which has little likelihood of ac-
ceptance in the immediate coming years. 2 ° We must never forget that
freedom is only "the absence of chains" 121 and when applying the chains
the courts should be slow, selective, and careful.
119 An amusing example is Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter. At first, legally banned,
see HAIGHT, INFORM,1AL NOTES ON SOME BOOKS BANNED FOR VARIOUS REASONS AT
VARIOUS TIMES AND IN VARIOUS PLACES 56 (rev. ed. 1955) ; Clift, Enduring Rights,
28 WILSON LIBRARY BULL. 853 (1954), and called "a brokerage of lust," Common-
wealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 116 (Ct. Quarter Sess. 1949), it is today on
public school reading lists as a morality tale!
120 "It is ironic that the suppressed books in one age in many cases become part
of the accepted literature or even the venerated classics of the next. Sometimes the
metamorphosis requires generations, sometimes only a few years." EHRLICH, HOWL
OF THE CENSOR Xii (1961). As to fields other than books see Parmelee v. United
States, 113 F.2d 729, 731-32 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; People v. Miller, 155 Misc. 446, 447,
279 N.Y. Supp. 583, 584 (Magis. Ct. 1935):
Twenty-five years ago women were arrested and convicted for appearing on
the beach attired in sleeveless bathing suits, or without stockings. . . . In
1906, the play "Sappho" was suppressed because the leading lady was carried
up a flight of stairs in the arms of a man. In 1907, Mary Garden was pre-
vented from appearing in the opera "Salome." . . . What was regarded as
indecent in the days of the Floradora Sextette, is decent in the days of the fan
and bubble dances.
And perhaps, we may add, downright decorous in the days of the bikini.
121 Spitz, Milton's Testament, 13 ANTIOCH REv. 290, 292 (1953) : "For freedom
strictly defined is still but the absence of chains. It is not the quality of being 'true'
or 'false' but simply the quality of being free."
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